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Introduction 
 
The application of European Union law 
within member states raises the so-called 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz question: is it the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the 
national courts that decide the boundaries of 
EU legislative acts? The German and British 
judiciaries have opposite responses. The 
German judiciary has resisted the authority 
of EU laws and the jurisprudence of the 
ECJ. The German Federal Constitutional 
Court (FCC) has asserted its own 
competence. In contrast, the British 
judiciary has readily acknowledged the 
ECJ’s competence and relinquished its own. 
This paper explains this contrast by arguing 
that the EU laws have a lesser impact on 
countries with written constitutions, like 
Germany, than on countries without written 
constitutions, for instance the United 
Kingdom (UK). Written constitutions, by 
crystallizing core national sovereign rights 
and constitutional principles, provide a basis 
for national judiciaries to assert their 
competence and protect national legal 
sovereignty against the encroachment of the 
EU laws and the ECJ’s jurisprudence. 
  
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
This paper draws on a classical theory of 
judicial behavior that assumes that the 
internal content of legal rules and judicial 
decisions matter for outcomes. Judges and 
courts are not simply self-interested political 
actors (Lasser 2004; Hilbink 2012).  
There are two major differences 
between the German and British judicial 
systems that could account for these 
different approaches. One is that Germany 
has a written constitution while the UK does 
not. The other is that Germany and the UK 
draw on different legal traditions. Germany 
is a civil law country while the UK is a 
common law country. Both of these 
differences fall into the category of 
differences in the content of legal rules. 
These differences form the basis for two 
hypotheses described below. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Written Constitutions  
 
The first hypothesis is that the impact of EU 
laws is lesser on countries with written 
constitutions than on countries without 
written constitutions because the former can 
use the written constitutions as a basis to 
assert their competence and shield national 
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legal order against the European legal 
integration.  
 For this hypothesis to be true, we 
should see, in countries with written 
constitutions, that judges refer to the 
constitutions as a basis for their decisions, 
assertions of competence, and resistance of 
the encroachment of EU laws and the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence. In contrast, in countries 
without written constitutions, judges do not 
refer to unwritten constitutional norms to 
make judicial decisions, assert their 
competence, or resist EU authorities. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Civil Law v. Common 
Law 
 
The second hypothesis is that the impact of 
EU laws is lesser on civil law countries than 
on common law countries. Because of the 
differences in the modes of adjudication and 
legal traditions, judicial activism 
traditionally exists in common law countries 
more than in civil law countries (Shapiro 
1981). Activist judges will be more likely to 
import EU law rather than assert the 
supremacy of their own national legal 
orders. Activist judges may see the ECJ as 
an ally against national governments. 
 For this hypothesis to be true, civil 
law countries should lack judicial activism 
while common law countries should have 
judicial activism.    
 
Testing Hypothesis 1: Written and 
Unwritten Constitutions  
 
The key question is whether the national 
courts treat the EU treaties as a European 
constitution or as traditional international 
law. The answer depends on the courts’ 
interpretation of their own national 
constitutions, which in turn depends on 
whether the constitution is written or 
unwritten. 
 
 The German Basic Law as the basis 
for the FCC’s competence 
 
Germany’s constitutional doctrines are 
enshrined in Article 79(3) of the Basic Law, 
which outlines core constitutional principles 
that are immune from any further 
amendment. The FCC has used Article 79(3) 
to assert its competence 
The FCC first asserted its 
competence in In Re Maastricht Treaty by 
drawing on the principle of democracy 
proposed by Article 79(3). It concluded that 
the European integration must be controlled 
by the representative of the people—the 
German Federal Parliament. The 
competences transferred to the EU must not 
permit an autonomous development towards 
an EU federal state. Hence, the FCC has the 
power to examine whether the EU legal 
instruments remain within the limits of the 
sovereign rights accorded to the EU. The 
supremacy of EU laws does not extend to 
ultra vires acts. 1 
 Therefore, the FCC has adopted an 
international law approach to EU laws, 
dictated by Article 79(3) that has established 
core fundamental constitutional principles 
the FCC is obligated to safeguard, thereby 
limiting the extent of the EU’s powers.  
 
 Absence of a written constitution as 
the barrier to the UK judiciary’s 
competence 
 
In contrast, the British unwritten 
“Constitution” exists as “a system of laws, 
customs, and principles which sets out the 																																																								1 BVerfG, In Re Maastricht Treaty - 2 BvR 
2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92.	
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nature, function and limits of the 
constitutive elements of the State” (Besson 
in Keller and Sweet 2008). The legal order 
depends on the doctrine of implied repeal—
the latest will of the Parliament 
predominates. Any parliament can repeal 
any existing statute. No sitting parliament 
can bind a future parliament. Parliament 
cannot entrench legislation by, for example, 
requiring a two-thirds majority to overturn 
the statute. Thus, Parliament cannot draft a 
constitution or create legislation that could 
act like a written constitution. 
 This is problematic in the EU context 
because the ECJ requires that EU law 
always prevail, even over a later British 
statute. Because there is no written 
constitution, the British courts could not 
imitate the FCC’s argument that the national 
constitution (but not national legislation) is 
superior to EU law. They decided that only 
accepting the ECJ’s competence is 
compatible with the Parliament’s decision to 
join the EU. 
 In Factortame, the House of Lords 
readily acknowledged the ECJ’s competence 
to override national judicial authorities.2 
Unlike the FCC, the House of Lords argued 
that the British Parliament conceded 
limitations on its sovereignty by enacting the 
European Communities Act of 1972. The 
British courts were merely exercising their 
duty under the European Communities Act.  
 In Thoburn, the High Court 
established a hierarchy of parliamentary 
acts—“ordinary” and “constitutional” 
statutes,3 which include the European 
Communities Act and cannot be repealed by 
implication. Hence, EU law is made a 
central part of the British Constitution. This 
argument is only possible because the lack 																																																								2 [1990] UKHL 7.	3 [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin).	
of a written constitution gave the High Court 
the opportunity to interpret EU law as part 
of the unwritten national constitution. The 
British courts did not cite any constitutional 
norms, and they limited the traditional 
doctrine of implied repeal.  
 
Testing Hypothesis 2: Civil Law and 
Common Law 
 
The second major difference is that 
Germany is a civil law country while the UK 
is a common law country. Common law 
judges have traditionally tended towards 
activism because the common law has a 
pragmatic mode of adjudication that stresses 
adaptability to new situations (Shapiro 1981; 
Craig in Slaughter, Sweet and Weiler 1998; 
Stein 1992; Merryman 1969).   
 
Judicial Activism in Germany 
 
The assumption that judicial activism is 
necessary for courts to accept EU law is 
correct.  However, modern civil law 
countries, particularly in Europe, have 
broken with the tradition of judicial 
deference. One key illustration is the parallel 
cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1973 and the FCC in 1975 regarding the 
same issue. The U.S. judiciary, as its British 
counterpart, follows common law traditions. 
In Roe v. Wade, the U.S. Supreme Court 
invalidated state criminal anti-abortion laws 
and imposed on legislatures a boundary 
within which the legislatures could act to 
regulate abortions.4 In contrast, in Abortion 
I, the FCC invalidated Section 218a of the 
Penal Code and rewrote the Penal Code.5  
 Therefore, because the German and 
the UK judiciaries equally demonstrate 																																																								4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).	5 BVerfGE 39,1/75.	
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judicial activism, the second hypothesis 
cannot explain the different responses to the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz question. 
 
   
 
Conclusion 
 
The constitutional doctrines implied by the 
written Basic Law of Germany and the 
unwritten British Constitution explain the 
two countries’ different responses to the 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz question.  
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